Liberation School Introduction:
This Thomas Sankara interview conducted by journalists from the monthly Afrique Asie newspaper touches on numerous topics of interest for revolutionaries. Sankara, the leader of a progressive and socialist faction within the military, had led a revolution in the country of Upper Volta roughly ten months prior. The country would be renamed Burkina Faso on August 2, 1984, two months after this interview took place. Sankara demonstrates a keen eye for international politics and a sober assessment of imperialist plots against his revolutionary government. He identifies unity as a strategic imperative, and one can see the difficulty, even for such a supremely charismatic personality as Sankara, of navigating the fractious terrain of leftist parties, unions, and mass organizations. One can easily see that throughout these struggles, Sankara maintains a selfless commitment to socialist and revolutionary principles.
As a word of caution, it must be kept in mind that the text of this document is a transcription of an audio interview conducted in a relaxed environment. This can lead to some inexact formulations by Sankara, such as verbal stumbles, interruptions, and numerous parenthetical phrases. These have been preserved to indicate the idiosyncratic communication style of Sankara. Where appropriate, the translators have added context in order to clarify the meaning behind Sankara’s words.
This is the 11th installment in Liberation School’s Thomas Sankara translation project, in collaboration with ThomasSankara.net, an online platform dedicated to archiving work on and by the great African revolutionary. As always, we express our gratitude to Bruno Jaffré for providing us the right to translate this material into English for the first time.
Thomassankara.net Introduction:
This previously unpublished interview was conducted in May 1984 by Augusta Conchiglia and Cherifa Benabdessadok, both journalists from the monthly Afrique Asie – a newspaper that also featured Malian journalist Mohamed Maïga until his death on January 1, 1984, in Ouagadougou.
What’s immediately striking is the kind of reciprocal connection that takes hold between Sankara and his interviewers/interlocutors. And this is easy to understand: Sankara is being interviewed by two women who come from a news outlet that is supportive of the Revolution. The relaxed atmosphere between them was such that the President felt perfectly at ease in developing his analysis.
We don’t know the exact date of the interview or on what occasion it was made, but it is very likely that it took place at the end of May 1984, and in any case, it probably took place a few days before June 11, 1984, the date on which seven people accused of a plot to be carried out on May 28 were executed.
In this interview, Thomas Sankara refers to the use of high-impact pressure groups such as trade unions that functioned as a maneuver for political destabilization. He talks about the dismissal of 1,400 primary-school teachers and the setting up of an office to review their cases. But he talks at much greater length about foiled counterrevolutionary plots and the arrest of around fifty military and civilians awaiting trial.
Among the military, he mentions by name Lieutenant Ouédraogo Moumouni and Colonel Didier Ouédraogo. The latter was accused of leading a plot aimed at coinciding with May 28, 1984, a date on which Sankara was supposed to be in Côte d’Ivoire. On May 27, 1984, Sankara’s official visit to Côte d’Ivoire was canceled; Ivorian authorities had refused to allow him to travel to Abidjan.
Sankara also recalls the existing crisis between the CDR (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution) and revolutionary political organizations such as LIPAD (Patriotic Development League) and PAI (African Independence Party), as well as the various ongoing initiatives to ensure unity between these groups, including the possibility of opening up to the PCRV (Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party).
This interview was provided to us in audio format. The transcription work was coordinated by Joagni Paré with the voluntary and productive participation of Guibien Cléophas Zerbo, Ikakian Romuald Somé, Kelly Zama Paré, Amado Gérard Kaboré, Rasmané Denné, Guillaume Launa, Tangi Bihan, and Bruno Jaffré, all members of the thomassankara.net team. We warmly thank them for their time and collaboration.
Joagni Paré
~~~~~~
Thomas Sankara: […] This reminds me of Mohamed Maïga, of the first time he interviewed me in Paris [1]. So as I was saying, if we don’t manage to question ourselves, to accept [the responsibility to] question ourselves, we won’t be able to move the Revolution forward, because we’ll be tempted at times to confuse the struggle to consolidate the Revolution with the struggle to consolidate our armchairs. We won’t know the difference. And that’s why – I don’t know if I’m telling you a secret here, but I’m working to convince myself that I’m just passing through and that whoever is next to me will have to take my place. That’s the only way to accept it. Otherwise, humanly speaking, it’s very hard. You’re there and one beautiful day you’re told no more, it’s no longer you, it’s someone else. You gotta be adaptable to the conditions.
Journalist: Right from the start?
Thomas Sankara: Ah yes, right from the start, you have to be adaptable to the conditions. And that way, the disappointment or frustration isn’t too strong and doesn’t trigger bitter struggles to maintain an armchair at all costs, otherwise … I hope I am able to live at least for more 30 years. Well … but if I had to spend 30 years fighting to keep a chair, it’s sad! Sad! Just thinking about it is terrible! And I envy presidents of a certain age. Because at least they leave the Presidency, they retire, they write books, or they do something else and cultivate gardens, that’s great.
Journalist: As for you… [is it] hard to retrain yourself?
Thomas Sankara: “For me, well, retraining [is] difficult, [it is a] permanent suspicion, we don’t understand that here.” … If I leave the Presidency today – whoever might come and replace me – to take up the commandos as I please, that won’t convince anyone! If I’m sent as a military attaché, I won’t enjoy it. I can’t accept that, because those are jobs I don’t like. So, there is a little bit of that.
Journalist: And we’ve been here for three weeks, coinciding with these events – well, a governmental crisis, anyway. [There was] even a threatened coup d’état.
Thomas Sankara: Ah yes, for which I’d like to say a word, huh.
Journalist: Yes.
Thomas Sankara: Well, there is a real threat of a coup. For some time now, we’ve been under direct pressure. First, there was the barbaric, open-air aggression of mercenaries. It’s true that we have risked on several occasions having mercenary disembarking [here].
Journalist: After August 4th? [2]
Thomas Sankara: After August 4. From August 5. A head of state confided me that he had been contacted about it. He was contacted by other states.
Journalist: So they chose the wrong people.
Thomas Sankara: No, no, no, he chose them … Well, yes, they [our opponents] had chosen their [potential supporters] badly because he was also [incomplete train of thought], not because he [the head of state sharing conspiracy details] was an ally of ours, but…
Journalist: He didn’t want to be an ally?
Thomas Sankara: He wanted to have peace and tranquility on the Upper Volta side, so that he could occupy himself with other business. So this permanent threat is something we’ve experienced. But now there’s less and less of it. Not that it has been totally eliminated. Benin [3] is a case that after five years in power, they still experienced aggression from ’72 to ’77 – but because our enemies feel that it’s a tactic that doesn’t pay off, it’s not the right move. At some point, they tried the tactic of political destabilization. Today, in Upper Volta, it’s the unions, it’s the pressure groups, it’s a very sensitive situation. They tried that, and we took action that allowed to us to neutralize their maneuver. As a result, we had to lay off 1,400 teachers. We don’t regret that at all. Today, we’re going to publish – you’ll hear it in the minutes of the Council of Ministers – we’re going to publish that an office has been set up to reexamine the cases. I have already reexamined certain cases in Koupéla.
Journalist: Of these 1,400 teachers?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, 1,400 teachers were dismissed. Some decisions were not thoroughly analyzed. And now they’re hanging on to the potential opponents, all those dismissed, fired, and others who don’t seem at all happy with us. And some of them are military, some civilians. They rely on each other. It is with this sector that our opponents are now really trying to organize. And the coups d’état, because in fact there are several of them, but the coups d’état we’ve foiled are essentially dependent on the military forces. Civilian reaction has handed over the weapons to the military, entrusting the military to manage these affairs.
Journalist: The enemy [wants] to be closer to the center of power?
Thomas Sankara: Well … No, but fortunately, this isn’t dissidence, it’s a manifestation of what we expected. And that’s why we’re not at all surprised. We’re not at all shaken by it, because we knew that these elements were, at worst, opportunists, and at best, true enemies of ours, more or less declared. And we were able to monitor them step by step. We didn’t know when the coup d’état was born; we have jumped on the moving bandwagon, but we’ve followed it right up to the present day. The meetings and everything, it’s our men who were in it with them and who followed them. I must say quite sincerely that we promised ourselves to keep it under control until the onset of their assault.
Journalist: But …?
Thomas Sankara: But certain elements have escaped us, and we think they’ve caught a whiff of infiltration. So they could have given us our submarines, our network of false information to catch us. And that’s why we stopped [the plot] earlier than expected.
Journalist: Can we know the number [of people involved]?
Thomas Sankara: As far as the military are concerned, there are about ten of them: two serving officers, two lieutenants, an artillery lieutenant … No, four serving officers. Finally, four officers with the latest arrests, because there were some last night.
Journalist: Really?
Thomas Sankara: Yes. As you can see, we haven’t slept. But we’re used to that by now. Then, all in all with the civilians, a good fifty people. But not all of them are … There are those we put in the government-ministers project without consulting them, because we know they don’t like the CNR. That’s obvious, but they didn’t conspire. There are those, and then there are those who were really cogitating, who were preparing something. But I don’t think there were more than a dozen people at the heart of the preparations.
Journalist: They had already been able to put together their project, their plan?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, their plan was simple: for them it was an attack on a few people, and this morning in the Council of Ministers they thought they had to attack us …
Journalist: Today?
Thomas Sankara: It’s a good thing I didn’t say that until after the council meeting, [Laughs] because it might not have happened … the liquidation, they were going to botch the file. They were going to tell us all about it. [Laughs] And the questioning of everything that had been done up to that point, which is fundamental, a bit like Guinea eh – Guinea after Sékou Touré. No more TPR [4], no more comrades, no more CDR [5] …
Journalist: Refocusing, as they say in Europe …
Thomas Sankara: Yes, a refocusing. Well, it’s like that, a total refocusing. One of their leaders, Lieutenant Ouédraogo Moumouni, whom we had appointed to take charge of sanitation in the city – just a method to find him a job, so we can get to know him very, very, very well!
Journalist: City sanitation? The one who takes care of the latrines?
Thomas Sankara: No, the person in charge of the latrines is someone else, the former director of protocol. Yes, and we were telling him that there are those who are bothered by all this litter and feel that the city needs to be cleaned up, and then there are those who feel that the litter should remain there too. So, who’s the cleaner between the two?
Journalist: [Laughs]
Thomas Sankara: No, he’s a … he was in charge of the garbage, that’s different. That’s really different. So Lieutenant Ouédraogo Moumouni was in charge of the garbage cans and we said to him, “Well, listen. If you want to join the revolution, you have to go through the front door, that is to say, through a total alliance with the CDR. We can’t clean up the city of Ouagadougou without the CDRs, because we don’t have the means, the road services, etc., to do it. So either you agree with the CDRs or you don’t. And you can’t agree with them. And you can only agree with the CDRs by adopting their slogans, etc., i.e. by living the Revolution. [Audio interrupted] … Upper Volta is a savanna country, so we see each other well and it’s difficult to confront anyone. That’s how we delegated, encouraging their project. And then, they had chosen their uh … the day when they needed to be stopped, we stopped them.
Journalist: There were still some on the loose, right?
Thomas Sankara: There was another group [of counterrevolutionaries] in operation still at large. In the end, these two groups were linked. But they were very skillful in their operations. At the grassroots level, they worked in separate groups so that if one group failed, the other at least had the chance to succeed. But at the planning level they are all the same thing, it’s the same people.
Journalist: Did they bring weapons from abroad or what …?
Thomas Sankara: We were the ones who supplied them with weapons. For example, weapons for the countryside. Their goal was to bring in foreign troops.
Journalist: It was an ambitious project!
Thomas Sankara: For sure. Ambitious, realistic. It is appealing, huh, even today. Attacking sensitive points and then, well …
Journalist: Not really mercenaries but troops?
Thomas Sankara: Troops! Well, I’m waiting for some conclusions, I don’t know what’s going to come out tonight. As for the nationalities, we can guess some, but only roughly speaking …
Journalist: Flyers are being distributed …? [Laughs]
Thomas Sankara: [Laughs] That’s how we say it in the business, but no violence, huh. We don’t torture anyone.
Journalist: [Laughs]
Thomas Sankara: Well, roughly speaking, they would have proceeded as follows: while they [the coup plotters] were attacking, the troops arrived with the message, the request was already drafted several months ago. So in formal terms, everything was legitimized a long time ago, in advance. The people arrive, done deal, for example, on behalf of the safety of the French nationals in danger [is enough to justify intervention]. Well, all you have to do is burn one or two cars and that’s it! One or two French cars burnt here is enough, and French troops are on their way. There are plenty of these cases at our neighbor’s, our friend Houphouët Boigny’s [6], and as it was to coincide with the 28th when I saw myself on the other side [of the border]. It was going to be a glorious victory, a double victory … I would have to ask for political asylum, accepting, recognizing the benefits of wisdom, the usefulness of wisdom, this wisdom, one of the beneficiaries of this wisdom. In the sequence, the headlines [would read], “Sankara asks for and receives asylum from Houphouët!” After things like that, once the press effect had worn off, I was [to be] handed over to the others [presumably the French]. Well, it was pretty well calculated from that point of view, but it was also counting on a certain amount of experience that we too are beginning to have in the field of intelligence, and [the low level of] our [security] services, not being up to the level of the best-known [agencies].
Journalist: Was [the plot] counting on the Hernus [7] of Europe or Africa?
Thomas Sankara: In any case, the orders came from Europe.
Journalist: So it’s always the same people?
Thomas Sankara: I don’t know if Charles Hernu is involved. I don’t know that, but it’s always the same people, yes. That’s for sure. That’s for sure. But it was going to be carnage, because today we’re sure that an event of this kind in Upper Volta would unleash … each province would be a maquis [8] in itself. Maybe maquis that would eventually fall for lack of coordination, organization, this and that. All right, it’s possible. But on a sentimental level, maquis would have popped up everywhere. That’s why we would have witnessed a carnage.
Journalist: In the end, it was more realistic, wasn’t it?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, from that point of view anyway.
Journalist: It’s astonishing that all this can happen so calmly. What we can see is a stability of power, even a serenity in relation to …
Thomas Sankara: Certainly.
Journalist: We didn’t experience the anxiety or the tension, and yet there were more than two events, because there was also the crisis.
Thomas Sankara: Yes, yes.
Journalist: It’s true that we don’t know exactly what the measure is, but it has given rise to rumors and debate. We could have felt tensions that were shaking things up a bit.
Thomas Sankara: In reality, we’re not worried, we’re not overly disturbed. We know that these are passing storms, because first of all, what are the chances of the coup d’état itself? Very slim indeed. One can assassinate a man passing by, all right. Especially when one doesn’t take many precautions. That’s possible, but it’s difficult to compromise the Revolution today, despite all the difficulties it could face. On the other hand, the crisis we’re having with LIPAD and PAI, I think PAI is a party that itself understands that it has no interest in this crisis. But we also have to understand that you can’t hurt a party’s feelings to such an extent and ask it to shut up and smile at the same time! It’s not easy. So everything the PAI is doing today is perfectly normal, I think. It’s even a special effort to contain themselves that has led them to reduce, or at least limit, the expression of their anger, disappointment, and so on. It’s normal, we shouldn’t ask any more of them.
Journalist: So we don’t have the impression of stability, but rather a reality …
Thomas Sankara: Certainly I … I don’t know what they think … You know, it often occurs to me to go and see the heads of state we’ve put in prison and ask them: “But you, on the eve of your fall, what were your feelings? Did you feel it coming on?” and see if we can still investigate … because I had the impression of instability … No, I’d tell you sincerely that it’s stable. It’s stable here, no matter what anyone says, it’s more stable here than with others, with neighbors we don’t really talk about. Because there are no consistent projects. It’s true that there are some discontented people here. But there isn’t a single center that can even sustain a serious [opposing] project. There is a Left, a certain Left that disagrees with us. We converge in principle [par en bas]. There are communicating networks, well, there are labyrinths through which we come together, so that all in all, they constitute a kind of useful guilty conscience. The Right itself is deactivated, and today it no longer has an external base, or even an internal base. Even on the outside [of our borders], they’re having trouble. We really need to turn Upper Volta into [Grenada] … If we decide, of course, to turn Upper Volta into Grenada [9], it’s possible.
Journalist: Is that possible?
Thomas Sankara: It’s possible! Grenada with a massive disembarking [of foreign troops], with a major means [of] …
Journalist: Grenada was destroyed from the inside …
Thomas Sankara: Yes, it was destroyed from the inside. It was destroyed from the inside. Well, if we decide …
Journalist: But the data is not the same as here …
Thomas Sankara: No, I don’t think so, I don’t think so. For the moment, no, that’s not possible. I don’t think, I don’t want it to be possible, but at least. Still, there’s real stability. And I regularly receive … if I had the police files here, I’d let you read them. But they regularly send me notes: “Comrade President, you must limit your outings, Comrade President, you must limit this, etc.” I understand for a policeman, but I’m not the only one. I understand for a policeman, but we really get on their nerves! I understand them, but I don’t, I don’t feel like I’m wandering around town, I don’t feel like I’m taking any risks. I don’t feel like I’m taking any risks, but I tell myself that in every Voltaic hides an embittered “insurgent” [“dégagé” [10]], that’s possible. Or well, maybe I’m lacking modesty when I say it – [I believe] it’s very possible, when I read what’s happened to others (the Pope or celebrities), that out of a feeling of resistance, people commit dangerous acts. Well, even that makes me think … Well, we haven’t reached that stage yet. So we’re protected by an environment that’s evolving at its normal level.
Journalist: So you’re not going to give up your outings, your freedom?
Thomas Sankara: It’s hard, I admit it’s hard! I was in Koupéla, I was on my way to Pô where we had demonstrations … That made me drive 600 km through the night, in other words, every kilometer was an ambush site. The driver dozes off, you doze off, you don’t know who’s driving. [Laughs]
Journalist: When you talk about Koupéla, I can imagine you isolated in a small hut in the middle of the bush. At that time, one might have thought that a long stay might have sparked dark ambitions in some people? Perhaps, a clumsiness on your part?
Thomas Sankara: In fact, I went to Koupéla because Koupéla is the stronghold of the reaction.
Journalist: Not to provoke them?
Thomas Sankara: That’s all it was. I went to live with them.
Journalist: They say that Koupéla is a traditionally conservative place …
Thomas Sankara: Without being indiscreet, may I ask who talked to you about Koupéla?
Journalist: Well, I heard about Koupéla over there, and then [name mentioned but inaudible].
Thomas Sankara: Well, that makes sense.
Journalist: [Laughs] Why? She’s suspected of …
Thomas Sankara: Ah yes. She’s from Koupéla, I understand! She’s got her Koupéla judgment and she thinks we’re being a bit too dramatic.
Journalist: What’s [the state] today’s reaction?
Thomas Sankara: Oh, it’s a dying reaction, isn’t it? It’s a reaction that’s dying, it doesn’t exist any longer … The proof is that, between the first days of our installation there and today, there’s a difference in tone. On the last day, you weren’t … Were you there when the chief had his trial?
Journalist: No, we were here the day before!
Thomas Sankara: You were there the day before. Well, the chief of Koupéla – this is terrible – there was a TPR on the spot, he was questioned, he had to explain himself, justify himself to a Fulani [11] and everything, everything, everything. Well, I practically didn’t speak up because I’d been accused of regionalism, tribalism and so on. [Laughs]
Journalist: [Laughs] Really? You’re in between them both, then?
Thomas Sankara: I’m somewhere in between. Well, it depends. Sometimes I feel more on one side than the other.
Journalist: You do have a sense of justice, don’t you?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, but I was always going to be suspected of being biased in favor of the Fulani, because he was the victim.
Journalist: It seems that the questions have been asked and that things have evolved a little.
Thomas Sankara: Definitely! In the space of a few days, things have obviously changed, and as I told them, we have to go back, others have to go back and hold meetings. I didn’t want to hold a meeting because the timing wasn’t right. But others could go back and do a good job there.
Journalist: We need to tackle this question of conflicts, which are generally social and even class-based, if you like; conflicts of interest, but which can hide behind ethnic conflicts. Before coming here, I heard, I read, I heard a lot about the Mossi [12] and their hold on the state apparatus, and that nothing can be done in this country without them. If you’re not Mossi, you don’t count, so to speak. Do you still believe that anyone can count on this divide, on these rivalries?
Thomas Sankara: No, no, no! Today, anyone from any region can come to lead this country without fear of the Mossis. Of course, there are still, there are still, perhaps vestiges [of that tradition] … In any case there are still forces that remain, that come from this complex that the Mossis have. There’s still some of that. But these forces are gradually dying out. And to make a calculation on that today is to be very, very wrong. It’s very, very wrong. And by the way, I don’t really play along with that. Well, I say to myself … When I make concessions to them, I say to myself while I’m at it if we can also get that fraction of people who still count on what the Mossi are or what the Mossi should be here. If we can get them on board, we might as well open doors for them. Like this old man who was talking to me about democracy, but “true democracy is the law of the greatest number. We Mossi are the most numerous and the government should, in its composition, show that the Mossi have been given their share,” and so on. No! If hosting him and putting up with him for fifteen minutes makes him happy, that’s excellent. There are steps like that, like hosting the imams of Upper Volta …
Journalist: It’s better to at least neutralize them?
Thomas Sankara: In this way. They come, they say yes to the Revolution. Well, too bad for them if they end up with contradictions. We don’t mind.
Journalist: Aren’t some of these discharged officers nostalgic? In any case, people who could, let’s say, feel that the dignity of Mossi power had been compromised?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, of course. In particular one of the colonels, Colonel Didier an insurgent that we’ve just arrested. Particularly him. For example, him …
Journalist: Is there such a thing as feeling …?
Thomas Sankara: Among the insurgents [dégagés], yes; among the insurgents, yes. But nobody, well, very few people follow them.
Journalist: So power used to rest a little on them. Was that a reality?
Thomas Sankara: It was a reality, it was. It was a reality that began to fade into disappearance, but which we had tried to maintain artificially for the needs of the cause. And we, by depriving this idea of its nourishment, of its usual propaganda, are letting it die on its own, effortlessly. That’s why we say here “Down with tribalism!” We hear that, but it’s to lengthen the list of sentences, it’s to lengthen the litany. That’s all it is. It’s not that we’re tackling a really serious problem. What we are seeing, however, is important … The Bobo Dioulasso [13] west region, you’ve both been there, haven’t you?
Journalist: Yes, too quickly though.
Thomas Sankara: Ah good! Have you had the chance to see Diallo? [Unclear statement]
Journalist: It was very quick because … First we went to the Kou valley, then we went to Banfora and then the commissioner thought it was more important for us to meet the women from the beginning to the end.
Thomas Sankara: [Laughs] That’s it. That’s it!
Journalist: [Laughs] Women with women.
Thomas Sankara: That’s it; it’s a problem, it’s another problem. Oh yes, all right. Right! Right! Right! I couldn’t get the High Commissioner on the phone.
Journalist: But I have to admit that I rubbed shoulders with him at one point. But I expected to see an officer in uniform and I didn’t make the association. It was only afterwards that I regretted having missed the opportunity. But I hope there will be others.
Thomas Sankara: OK, so on the western side there in Bobo Dioulasso, there’s a kind of nontribal regionalism eh, nontribal. During colonization, Bobo Dioulasso was the economic city of Upper Volta, even of the subregion. It was also a military town. The French army had a very strong presence there, and so on. So today, the people of Bobo can’t understand why Ouagadougou has become the capital. Especially since Maurice Yaméogo – the first president – who did it, who overturned the balance, did it so dexterously. He went so far as to threaten people. So much so that the people of Bobo have had this stuck in their throat to this day. So for certain decisions, we feel that Bobo is slow to come around. We make the decision in Ouagadougou, we publish it on the radio, but we still have to make a trip to Bobo to … Oh, over there they’re happy, they’re flattered. It means we have to travel.
Journalist: There are two capitals, after all …
Thomas Sankara: Yes, there’s constant competition. Well, there used to be Ouahigouya in the north, Ouahigouya northeast of Ouagadougou.
Journalist: Isn’t it a Mossi zone, is it?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, it’s Mossi, but between Mossi they don’t get along; between Mossi they don’t get along. There are the Mossi from the center, Ouagadougou. And then there are the Mossi from Ouahigouya, who believe that the Mossi, they agree that the Mossi are the nobles, but they are the nobles of the Mossi.
Journalist: The most nobles among the nobles.
Thomas Sankara: That’s it! And that’s another thing. There are songs here, but it’s terrible. In fact, it’s because they were too aligned behind one man, Gérard Kango, Prime Minister, President of the National Assembly, a truly charismatic man. Negative charisma, but charisma nonetheless. He imposed himself, “the gentleman from London” as he was known. A man full of thoughtfulness, manners, and courtesy, but on the international scene he was one of the most assertive Voltaïques. Unfortunately, he didn’t have the public presence to enter all the forums. But if he had it, he would have left his name in African history. Since he’s a man with a sense of show business, he’s got a sense of the one-man show. He really has a feel for it, and he pulls it off.
Journalist: Where is he now?
Thomas Sankara: He’s in Pô [14]. He’s cultivating a field in Pô. Blaise [15] sent me a note to let me know how things were going.
Journalist: And are things going well?
Thomas Sankara: Yeah, things are fine. He fell, he felt dizzy. Because on the spot, you see, the man as he is, who wants to demonstrate that he is more revolutionary than the others who are detained with him, who wants to cultivate faster and harder than the others, but then who surpasses himself so much that … he had seizures, he fell into syncope. He had to be resuscitated.
Journalist: What he did was Stakhanovite? [16]
Thomas Sankara: So Stakhanovite to death, and everything. That’s him, Gérard Kango. First everywhere. First everywhere: first in prison, first out. So Gérard Kango is doing well. Apart from that, it’s hard to see him as a possible anchor for an opposition; he’s very weak.
Journalist: In terms of intermingling, the Mossi are all over the place. They’re everywhere, but they fight amongst themselves.
Thomas Sankara: Yes, it’s mainly the Mossis who are all over the place. It must also be said that out of necessity … It’s a bit like the Jews, out of necessity they …
Journalist: The Jews were in the minority, whereas the Mossis are in the majority.
Thomas Sankara: What I meant is that wherever they are, they excel because they live in harsher conditions. If the conditions require them to move to the west, they settle down and become village chiefs. There are a lot of them, they have a lot of children, they farm a lot, and so on.
Journalist: They’re looking to move up the hierarchy …
Thomas Sankara: Systematically. They say that when two Mossi fall into a hole, into a well, the second thing they do is trying to get out. The first thing is trying to figure out who will be the chief. And the question of getting out will only be asked and resolved once the question of “who’s the chief?” has been answered.
Journalist: So, since this is not a major problem, the Revolution is not directly threatened by conspiracies, which, as you said, have very little chance of succeeding. There are, however, problems that arise, I imagine. In particular, it seems to me that there are problems within the [governing] coalition itself, so to speak, between the military and the civilian side. I know you don’t like this distinction, because you’re just as much a civilian as everyone else, I agree. Can we quickly assess the situation? Is unity getting stronger, is the clarification underway, or is it something yet to be achieved?
Thomas Sankara: [Pulls out a piece of paper and shows it to the two journalists] This letter, for example, shows that we are in the process of overcoming our dissensions, our quarrels.
Journalist: From whom to whom?
Thomas Sankara: From me to the organizations that are involved, that are with us in the PAI, the ULC [17] and the military, the military organizations.
Journalist: Can we read it?
Thomas Sankara: No, I can’t read it to you. But I’ll just give you the idea. It’s simply a letter we’re sending to confirm [the strengthening of our ties], through the designation of people and so on …
Journalist: You’re committed to maintaining dialogue?
Thomas Sankara: Yeah. Well, no, it’s more a timetable I’m drawing up for the creation of a single movement.
Journalist: Really? So you’ve set deadlines, milestones?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, the debate has been going on for some time now.
Journalist: The impression we get is that some people aren’t really in a hurry.
Thomas Sankara: Yes, we understand them. You know, in soccer, when you want to put together a team with only one or two Pelés, you have to put up with their whims, that’s normal. But all you have to do is throw the ball in the street, and all children learn to play. After a while, there are so many of them that, well …
Journalist: Unity can be achieved without the Pelés.
Thomas Sankara: Right. Or that the Pelés have to rush to avoid missing the meetings. It’s normal that some people aren’t in a hurry. Because everyone [especially those with Pelé’s personality] imagines that unity only occurs because of them. “Come to me, that’s what unity is, without me there is no unity.” We have a few problems with that, because after all, it’s the military who are curiously the least sectarian, the most tolerant. If we’re going to talk about sectarianism, it’s the military who are the most tolerant. But the fact that organizing around the military gives the impression that they’re posing as a power that’s on the lookout, playing duplicitous games with others. That’s the reality.
Journalist: Are you moving toward a reformulation, a redefinition of the political platform?
Thomas Sankara: Based on the one that is already defined.
Journalist: Yes, from the August 2nd speech.
Thomas Sankara: Yes, yes.
Journalist: Is this going to happen in the next few months?
Thomas Sankara: Not just yet, because …
Journalist: You’ve put your foot on the gas pedal on this effective unity of left-wing forces in pursuit of unity …
Thomas Sankara: Even an opening toward the PCRV [18]…
Journalist: Oh my! [Laughs] It’s a personal reason, but the PCRV … dogmatism scares me. I was a militant in a communist party. I have no problem feeling that I belong to a communist party. I have no such taboos, but I think their way of interpreting politics …
Thomas Sankara: But in fact, there’s less dogmatism in what’s being done than subjective quarrels.
Journalist: Perhaps. But reading the documents that are published …
Thomas Sankara: On the other hand, when I read it, it encouraged me.
Journalist: Really? They weren’t the same?
Thomas Sankara: Which one have you read? Number 18?
Journalist: No, it’s a sort of assessment of the various demands made by the unions under the PCRV umbrella. It’s not a political document, it’s a union document.
Thomas Sankara: Well, that’s a bit old! That’s a bit old. It’s not very recent at all.
Journalist: Oh, has there been an improvement since then?
Thomas Sankara: Not even that. Compared to what they were, there’s been a terrible evolution.
Journalist: But it still seemed very out of place given the context. That’s the impression we got.
Thomas Sankara: But I also know that not all the organizations that are with us are ready to accept them. But we won’t refuse [the unions under the PCRV umbrella].
Journalist: And to be direct, with LIPAD and PAI, has there been a popular front? Have things been clarified yet?
Thomas Sankara: There’s a popular front, after all. There was a popular front and I sense that they too don’t want to give in so easily. It’s all part of the game. It’s a question of understanding and not worrying too much. This doesn’t bother me at all. The PAI ministers are in the government with us, they take part in cabinet meetings, they discuss just as actively as the others, we send them on missions, some of them have just returned, and so on.
Journalist: So there’s no crisis in government, no use of government for [sectarian] political purposes?
Thomas Sankara: No, no, no. Well, now there are some who say they’re disappointed, disappointed because they didn’t think we’d do this or that for them.
Journalist: You’re the first to be disappointed, aren’t you?
Thomas Sankara: Yes. Well, I think it was a useful crisis, because it was the last straw that broke the camel’s back … I’ve had my share of similar overbearing straws, but perhaps on such a personal level that it was embarrassing to raise the issue out of modesty. But I knew …
Journalist: When did you know them?
Thomas Sankara: Now and a little before. Even before August 4th. But I knew that at military level the political level isn’t always very high, and then there are instincts that resurface. When the fighting starts, well, the military, they’ve learned to fight … That’s what comes back! They want things to be clear cut, and our civilian comrades, who are used to the same political maneuvering as the rest of us, are at a loss when the military elements – I wouldn’t say militarists – drag them back to this other reality. So we have to deal with that.
Journalist: Don’t you think that’s how future crises will emerge?
Thomas Sankara: No, no, no! That’s not very serious. Now, what we need to fear … Well, when a political organization encounters difficulties, overcomes a crisis with another organization, dissension and factionalism are bound to arise within the organization that has undergone the crisis. In any case, cohesion is no longer total, even if it doesn’t go as far [as a complete division] … it’s like cracks. There will be the hardliners; there will be the moderates, the conciliators, the realists, and so on. And then there will be those in the middle who will try to reconcile, to fill the gaps. Then, that calls for political auctioning, for demagogy. So, who in the PAI will still work to safeguard cohesion? Because I know, I feel, I’m acquainted with the PAI. It overcomes these crises, but who will have an interest in seizing upon them to say that, more than ever, the troops must be aligned … Well, it’s the hundred-year war.
Journalist: More than ever …?
Thomas Sankara: More than ever, it must be a war to the death.
Journalist: Taking the opportunity to assert yourself once and for all?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, and we have no interest in the country being weakened by domestic dissensions and crises. We have no interest whatsoever in seeing us weakened.
Journalist: It depends on where the weakening comes from. Does the weakening mean that the country’s rank and file are disassociating themselves from certain leaders and joining the CDRs, for example, or something else?
Thomas Sankara: So, personally, that’s what I fear the most. That it will take … well, that there will be dissension among them. For those who agree, the question could be posed like this: should we stay in the government or not? Those who will feel that it’s such a humiliation, that [power] is in the[ir] blood and so on. Listen, they wouldn’t even have 25 people behind them, but still. History has also shown that those who leave with the support of the troops are the ones who do the most damage. [Laughs]
Journalist: But we’re not there yet?
Thomas Sankara: No! No! No, we’re not there yet, and I know that the PAI has an interest and will move toward unity. Maybe they’ll set more conditions for unity – a scalded cat fears cold water, all right. And that’s normal too, they’ll be right.
Journalist: What conditions could the PAI demand?
Thomas Sankara: Especially in relation to other organizations, what [could they demand]! Because in fact, no matter what anyone says, the problem isn’t with us. It’s between them, who have known each other long before we did.
Journalist: There aren’t many organizations? There aren’t many of them?
Thomas Sankara: No, there aren’t many of them, there’s no mass. It’s them [the PAI] and the ULC mostly. Well, the others aren’t organized.
Journalist: We have the impression that, in a way, at least in certain sectors, [disunity] contributes to blocking situations a little by not sharing the activities of people who are either in another organization, or who are independent. There are people who have just joined the Revolution and who are currently full of projects, possibilities, initiatives and imagination, and who, it seems to me, are a little blocked by things they don’t understand, or by a kind of inertia due to what you were saying earlier – the race to the armchair or the maintenance of the armchair.
Thomas Sankara: Yes, that’s true. And that’s why, from time to time, you need a minimum of firmness to shake people up. This morning, for example, I didn’t attend the cabinet meeting. I was in one of our offices playing the policeman, but we need that …
Journalist: Playing the policeman?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, playing the policeman. But we need that. We need that. Otherwise, people don’t understand. They settle in too easily, too quickly. We need to show everyone that they’re not here for the benefits. And that’s why they must listen to the others. Just because one’s already settled in, or has been appointed Minister of the CNR, doesn’t mean his word is the unquestionable gospel.
Journalist: To conclude, how do you see the coming months? Decisive months for consolidating everything …
Thomas Sankara: Yes, I think so. I sincerely believe it. For example, with the work we’re doing, the work we’ve already undertaken to consolidate the military trend – it’s still going on, with the assessments we’re going to make, with the need to refocus, to redefine our objectives. These are going to be decisive months. And especially as we head toward August 4, it’ll be time for assessment. And we’ll take note, we’ll know who’s right and who’s not, who’s less right and then learn to be more careful. And above all, for me – I thought you were going to ask me this question, unless it’s toward the end – the current economic problems are what worries me. Because those [political] problems don’t bother me as much as these [economic issues].
Journalist: We’ve indeed given priority to political issues, because we feel that they are a hindrance to the resolution, or at least the realization, of projects, to the awareness of real problems.
Thomas Sankara: Ah yes, that’s right. Well, the economic problems, I say to myself that the grace period for me is running out. We have to do well, we have to do better than what has been done. Of course, in the meantime, we’ll have to develop even more initiatives, and that’s not easy, especially in times like these when there are crises just about everywhere. But in return for maintaining and mobilizing at a given level – which is also the political condition – we have a program that is realistic, very simple, executable and that will translate, have a positive impact and mobilize even more people.
Journalist: Really?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, these are projects by province. We have made each province autonomous for a certain number of projects. And that’s going to happen. At the level of the province, it releases its own resources and realizes its ambitions. And that’s how, at the grassroots level, we can see that there has been a qualitative, concrete transformation in their lives. This will enable us to free up even more resources at national level for certain larger, more ambitious projects.
Journalist: What were your initial ambitions with the August 4th Cities? [19]
Thomas Sankara: The August 4th Cities are a lesson. They’re really a lesson of mobilization and organization on the site of democratic and popular bases, on political bases. That’s why I’ve been criticized for launching it without all the necessary preparation and so on. And I know that all this comes from … Fortunately we know each other, I know where it comes from. And that’s why it doesn’t bother me. But I also know that those who say it know very well that if it hadn’t been for that, it would have been difficult to take stock on August 4. To say that there have been so many support marches, so many meetings, so many debate vigils, those are not the kind of balance sheet you’d expect, right! The IMF doesn’t count that, for the Paris Club, it is meaningless. But to say that we’ve built 500 villas is quite something. [Audio interrupted by a phone call] … It’s coming, isn’t it? It’s consistent, the balance sheet we’re going to present on August 4.
Journalist: And then?
Thomas Sankara: And now, from this lesson of mobilization, we have a major program, which is what I did in Koupéla in particular: building schools, dispensaries, maternity wards, pharmacies, post offices, grain banks, [military] bases for certain localities, cinema halls, and of course dance halls and dance floors.
Journalist: [Laughs] That’s a priority too?
Thomas Sankara: [Laughs] Top priority. You know we’re in talks with the French government about launching an orchestra?
Journalist: Really?
Thomas Sankara: They don’t understand it over there … They’re starting to wonder over there, in Paris, how this can be the concern of a regime that is said to be in crisis and all, and which talks about guitars and drums.
Journalist: It’s really about creating basic structures.
Thomas Sankara: That’s right. Totally! We want to say – you noticed it when you left Ouagadougou, you went next door really there’s nothing left. What we want to say, what we want to do, we’ll say: a province equals at least this and that [amenity]. If you can have more, if you can have more Silmandé [20] hotels, fine, that’s your business. But the minimum is this and that [amenity]. So when you come back here in two years’ time, for example, I hope when you come back in two years’ time you should be able to find a hotel chain everywhere. Modest, simple, OK; but clean, well-maintained and functional. So that you don’t have to worry about where to stay, so that you can be sure of regular film screenings and sports facilities everywhere.
Journalist: And to do that, you have to produce.
Thomas Sankara: And to do that, we have to produce. But we think we have the resources to produce. It’s mainly agriculture, and we need water reservoirs, and more water reservoirs everywhere. We encourage people to do this, we encourage them, we organize them, we look for the means. Our agriculture has to be able to … first of all, truly attain self-sufficiency, but also, and this is a mission, to ensure that we become a food power.
Journalist: To export?
Thomas Sankara: Yes, and we believe in it. We believe in it very seriously. Because we can see, in the long term, if things continue, if trends continue, which countries around us are going to buy Voltaic rice.
Journalist: Mali, for example?
Thomas Sankara: Côte d’Ivoire too. Yes, because in Côte d’Ivoire they started farming, but we know what it’s all about. It’s very fragile. All it takes is one little thing for … Our ambition is to supply them with food products.
Interviewed in May or June 1984 by Augusta Conchiglia and Cherifa Benabdessadok, journalists with the monthly Afrique Asie.
References
[1] Mohammed Mohamed Maïga (1950-1984) was an influential Malian journalist. While studying abroad, Maïga came into contact with left wing ideas including Pan-Africanism and socialism. He started two notable leftist magazines, Jeune Afrique and Afrique-Asie, through which Maïga met and built a relationship with Thomas Sankara. Maïga tragically died in 1984 on a trip to Burkina Faso.[2] August 4th is the date of the Burkinabé Revolution which brought to power a military-popular government with a socialist orientation.
[3] At the time, Benin was a worker’s state led by a socialist party.
[4] Popular Revolutionary Tribunals. These tribunals were staffed by workers, peasants, and soldiers to oppose counterrevolutionary agents and corrupt officials.
[5] Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. The CDRs, modeled after the Cuban example, were a form of popular organization and mobilization. They were organized based on geography and economic sector.
[6] Houphouët Boigny was the pro-French president of the Ivory Coast. Over his three-decade-long reign, Boigny hatched numerous plots and coup attempts against socialist, sovereign, and anti-imperialist groups throughout West Africa in service of French imperialism.
[7] Charles Hernu was the French Minister of Defense from the Socialist Party. Like the Socialist Party at large, he was a supporter of French neocolonialism.
[8] Short for maquisard, the guerrilla forces of France and Belgium which fought against Nazi occupation. Maquisards were politically mixed, but the most active cells were led by cadre of the French Communist Party. The word means underbrush as a form of underground or hidden operation.
[9] Referring to the socialist revolution led by the New Jewel Movement of Grenada. https://www.liberationschool.org/the-legacy-of-the-grenadian-revolution-lives-on/
[10] i.e. a disengaged person or a social outcast.
[11] One of the 63 ethnic groups of Burkina Faso.
[12] The largest of Burkina Faso’s ethnic groups. The Mossi had historically held a hegemonic position in the country’s political system.
[13] The second largest city of Burkina Faso, after Ouagadougou.
[14] A city in the south of Burkina Faso and home to one of the largest army bases in the country. Sankara was stationed there prior to his ascension to national prominence.
[15] Referring to Blaise Compaoré, Thomas Sankara’s right-hand man and future murderer. It was Compaoré’s betrayal which returned Burkina Faso to the status of a neocolony.
[16] Referring to the Stakhanovite movement of the 1930s in the Soviet Union. Named after Alexei Stakhanov, the Stakhanovite movement was an attempt to increase production during the second five-year plan by encouraging the emulation of highly productive techniques and comradely competition at the point of production.
[17] ULC – Union of Communist Struggles, one of the main pillars of the governing coalition.
[18] PCRV – Voltaic Revolutionary Communist Party.
[19] The August 4th Cities were communal housing projects situated around the capital Ouagadougou.
[20] Silmandé is a luxury hotel in Ouagadougou.
